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WITHDRAWING A LICENSE TO KILL: WHY 
AMERICAN LAW SHOULD JETTISON 
“STAND YOUR GROUND” AND ADOPT THE 
ENGLISH APPROACH TO RETREAT 
FRANKLIN STOCKDALE* 
Abstract: The justification of self-defense generally allows the use of a reasona-
ble amount of force when a victim of an attack has a reasonable belief that the 
use of force is necessary in order to prevent an imminent harm. For centuries, the 
justification of self-defense included a duty of the victim—or defendant—to re-
treat before resorting to force. Today in the United States, this duty has been 
eliminated entirely in many jurisdictions. In England, however, the duty has not 
been done away with but has, instead, been incorporated into the reasonableness 
aspect of self-defense, which evaluates whether the amount of force used by the 
defendant was reasonable and whether the defendant’s belief of an imminent 
harm was reasonable. The English version, therefore, allows the use of force 
even when retreat is possible but only when it can be shown that it was reasona-
ble not to retreat. U.S. jurisdictions should undo the outright abandonment of the 
duty to retreat and adopt the English adjustment because it is better suited to both 
to gun culture in the United States and to the protection of human life. 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans own more guns than their counterparts in other wealthy na-
tions.1 In fact, one in four Americans, 35% of American households, own at 
least one gun.2 The Supreme Court has held that the Second Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution guarantees an individual right to gun ownership—especially 
when the gun is kept for self-defense.3 For better or worse, American law op-
erates in an environment that is heavily armed.4 Nonetheless, American laws 
have adopted an ever-expanding view of self-defense justifications by dimin-
ishing the common-law requirement of retreat and eliminating the requirement 
                                                                                                                           
 * Franklin Stockdale is an Articles Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
 1 See PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO 
KNOW 2 (2014). 
 2 See id. at 2–4. 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. II; McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2010); District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593–94 (2008). 
 4 See COOK & GOSS, supra note 1, at 2–4. 
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in certain situations.5 Meanwhile, America’s common-law ancestor, England, 
has expanded the justification by incorporating the duty to retreat into the de-
termination of whether the use of force in self-defense was reasonable.6  
This Note examines the ways in which the United States and England ap-
proach the obligation to retreat in the context of self-defense. It advocates that 
U.S. jurisdictions should adjust their laws to reflect English law so that the 
obligation to retreat is included as a factor to consider when assessing whether 
the defendant’s use of force in self-defense was reasonable. Part I of this Note 
describes the status of the self-defense justification in U.S. and English crimi-
nal law. Part II discusses the legal development of self-defense in both systems 
through an examination of significant cases, the history of self-defense, gun 
ownership statistics, and homicide rates. Part III evaluates the positive and 
negative qualities of the different approaches and concludes the English ap-
proach is preferable—even with private gun ownership as high as it is in the 
United States. In particular, including retreat in the assessment of the reasona-
bleness requirement is superior because it puts greater emphasis on human life 
and safety, which is particularly important in a society that is built on laws and 
replete with guns. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The legal systems of the United States and England are intimately related 
due to their shared cultural heritage and common-law systems—the latter of 
which is identified as the body of law first developed in England by judicial 
application of precedent set by prior cases.7 This English law followed colo-
                                                                                                                           
 5 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012(2) (West 2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b)(2.3) (2014); 
Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199–200 (1876). 
 6 See R v. Julien, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 839 (AC) at 843 (Eng.) (“It is not . . . the law that a person 
threatened must take to his heels and run in [a] dramatic way . . . ; but what is necessary is that he 
should demonstrate by his actions that he does not want to fight.”); R v. Bird, [1985] 2 All E.R. 513 
(AC) at 516 (Eng.) (“There were formerly technical rules about the duty to retreat before using force, 
or at least fatal force. This is now simply a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether it was 
necessary to use force, and whether the force was reasonable.” (quoting JOHN C. SMITH & BRIAN 
HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 327 (5th ed. 1983))). 
 7 See Common Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) [hereinafter Common Law, 
BLACK’S]; DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE: INTRODUCTORY 
MATERIALS 1 n.1 (2d ed. 2004); Common Law, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/128386/common-law [https://perma.cc/7SZG-HQ69] (last visited Mar. 23, 2016); 
OLIVER LEWIS, HOW IMPORTANT ARE SHARED CULTURE, LANGUAGE, AND VALUES TO THE ‘SPE-
CIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES?’, (Dec. 3, 2007), http://www.e-ir.
info/2007/12/03/how-important-are-shared-culture-language-and-values-to-the-%E2%80%98special-
relationship%E2%80%99-between-britain-and-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/27CG-QHT2] (“Brit-
ain and America are widely perceived to share many of the same, largely ‘liberal’, values. Bilateral 
relations between the United States and the United Kingdom are arguably conducted along these lines, 
where shared liberal capitalist ideals are the currency and wider cultural similarities add to the sense 
of solidarity between the two . . . .”). 
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nists to North America through clauses in their colonial charters that permitted 
them to establish laws but which also held English law as superior, forbidding 
any colonial law that conflicted with English law.8 Upon American independ-
ence, the former colonies’ newly empowered state legislatures enacted statutes 
formally adopting the common law of England.9 This trend continued such that 
every state except Louisiana adopted similar statutes embracing the common 
law.10 Of course, these statutes only adopt the common law to the extent per-
mitted and amended by the U.S. Constitution or state law.11 Further, through 
early cases, American judges not only relied on the law of England in their 
decisions but also adapted it to fit the needs of the new American society.12 
One of the areas of law in which this adaptation was most pronounced was 
regarding the justification of self-defense.13 
Justifications and excuses are defenses to criminal charges.14 Excuses, 
like insanity or involuntary intoxication, are defenses that demonstrate a crimi-
nal defendant is not actually blameworthy for his otherwise criminal acts.15 
Justifications, on the other hand, are defenses that show a lawful reason for the 
defendant’s actions—the absence of which would render them criminal.16 Jus-
tifications include necessity and self-defense.17 The justification of self-
defense generally provides that a reasonable amount of force may be used to 
repel an attack when the victim has a reasonable belief that the use of force is 
necessary to prevent the imminent attack.18 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See COQUILLETTE, supra note 7, at 368. 
 9 See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. XXV; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.01 (West 2014); 1 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 1503(a) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-50 (1976); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-200 (2015). 
 10 Common Law, BLACK’S, supra note 7. 
 11 See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. XXV; 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1503(c) (West 1972); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 14-1-50; VA. CODE ANN. § 1-200. 
 12 See RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, NO DUTY TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY 5–6 (1991); COQUILLETTE, supra note 7, at 505. 
 13 See SANFORD KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 
865 (9th ed. 2014). 
 14 See Excuse, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Justification, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 15 See Excuse, supra note 14; KADISH ET AL., supra note 13, at 817; ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRIN-
CIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 96 (5th ed. 2006). 
 16 See Justification, supra note 14; KADISH ET AL., supra note 13, at 817; ASHWORTH, supra note 
15, at 96–97. 
 17 Necessity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A justification defense for a person 
who acts in an emergency that he or she did not create and who commits a harm that is less severe 
than the harm that would have occurred but for the person’s actions.”); Self-Defense, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 18 Self-Defense, supra note 17; see ASHWORTH, supra note 15, at 139. 
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A. Status of U.S. Law 
The common law imported to North America from England restricted the 
use of deadly force in self-defense to situations in which no retreat was possi-
ble.19 Early in American history, this common-law duty to retreat was found to 
be ill suited for American life and values—especially along the frontier.20 In 
Erwin v. State, an oft-cited case decided one hundred years after American in-
dependence, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered the common-law require-
ment of retreat before rejecting it and stating: 
The law, out of tenderness for human life and the frailties of human 
nature, will not permit the taking of it to repel a mere trespass, or 
even to save life, where the assault is provoked; but a true man, who 
is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by vio-
lence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him enor-
mous bodily harm.21 
Quickly after Erwin, the duty to retreat was shed in many states as courts 
adapted the common law to fit what they perceived to be the American way of 
life.22 If state courts did not act to diminish the duty to retreat, state legislatures 
often did.23 To this day, the status of the duty to retreat varies from state to 
state and is frequently still subject to revision by the state judiciaries and legis-
latures.24 
This process has resulted in a patchwork of law varying from state to 
state.25 Despite the impact of the Erwin decision, some states continue to re-
quire retreat in order to assert the justification of self-defense, particularly 
when a person is attacked outside of their dwelling place.26 Hawaii, for exam-
ple, forbids the use of force in self-defense when a person knows that he or she 
can retreat with complete safety, or by surrendering anything to which the at-
                                                                                                                           
 19 See BROWN, supra note 12, at 3–5; KADISH ET AL., supra note 13, at 865; FIONA LEVERICK, 
KILLING IN SELF-DEFENCE 70 (2006). 
 20 See Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199–200 (1876); BROWN, supra note 12, at 8–10; KADISH 
ET AL., supra note 13, at 865. 
 21 Erwin, 29 Ohio St. at 199–200; see BROWN, supra note 12, at 8–10; KADISH ET AL., supra note 
13, at 865. 
 22 See Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877); BROWN, supra note 12, at 5, 8; KADISH ET AL., 
supra note 13, at 865. 
 23 See KADISH, supra note 13, at 865–66. 
 24 See id. 
25 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304(5)(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012(2); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 505(b); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 2305 (West 2014).  
 26 See KADISH, supra note 13, at 865–67; see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304(5)(b); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13 § 2305; State v. Albano, 102 A. 333, 334 (Vt. 1917). The law of the state of Vermont 
allows the use of force in self-defense, but case law from 1917 indicates that force may not be used in 
self-defense when sufficient means are available to avoid it. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 2305; Al-
bano, 102 A. at 334. 
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tacker claims a right.27 The justification of self-defense is also not available 
under Hawaiian law when a person can cooperate with a demand from the at-
tacker that he or she refrain from acting in a manner in which he or she has no 
obligation to act.28 Hawaiian law, however, does create the exception that a 
person has no duty to retreat from his or her “dwelling or place of work, unless 
he [or she] is the initial aggressor or is assailed in his [or her] place of work” 
by a known co-worker.29 In contrast to Hawaii, however, several other states 
do not require retreat from a place that a person has a right to be.30 
The state of Pennsylvania offers a poignant example of variation and evo-
lution of self-defense law in the United States.31 Pennsylvania law establishes 
that the use of force is justifiable in self-defense when the person using force 
believes that it was “immediately necessary” to protect himself “against the 
use of unlawful force by [another] person on the present occasion.”32 This pro-
vision has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1972 when the official 
comment asserted that it made “no substantial change in existing law.”33 The 
restrictions on a defendant’s ability to use force in self-defense, however, have 
changed.34 The 1972 law stated: 
The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless 
the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself 
against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse 
compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if . . . the actor 
knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with com-
plete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to 
a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a 
demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to 
take, except that . . . the actor is not obliged to retreat from his 
dwelling or place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is 
assailed in his place of work by another person whose place of work 
the actor knows it to be . . . .35 
                                                                                                                           
27  HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304(5)(b). 
28 Id. § 703-304(5)(b)(i). 
 29 Id. 
 30 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012(2); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b)(2.3). 
 31 Compare 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2) (West 1972), with 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 505(b)(2.3). 
 32 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(a). 
 33 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505 (West 1972) Official Comment – 1972. 
 34 Compare 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505 (b)(2), with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505 
(b)(2.3). 
 35 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2)(ii)(A) (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the 1972 law required retreat by the defendant before the use of force in 
self-defense was permitted—except when inside a dwelling or place of work.36 
In 2011, prior to the killing of Florida teen Trayvon Martin and the na-
tional focus on so-called “stand your ground” laws, Pennsylvania added two 
new and significant portions to its law regarding the right to use force in self-
defense.37 The 2011 version of the law, in force today, removed the require-
ment that a person must surrender a possession or must refrain from lawful 
action pursuant to the attacker’s demand before using force.38 It also added 
sections qualifying the duty to retreat and the justified use of force, which had 
the effect of diminishing the duty to retreat and expanding the justified use of 
force.39 
The new law creates a presumption that an actor reasonably believes “dead-
ly force is immediately necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily 
injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat” when the 
force is used against a person who 
is in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or has unlaw-
fully and forcefully entered and is present within, a dwelling, resi-
dence or occupied vehicle; or the person against whom the force is 
used is or is attempting to unlawfully and forcefully remove another 
against that other’s will from the dwelling, residence or occupied 
vehicle.40  
The subsequent section of the statute creates exceptions that prohibit the use of 
deadly force in family situations, in the context of criminal activity, where a 
person has a right to enter, and when peace officers are involved.41 A later sec-
tion states that a person who does not fall within these exceptions is presumed 
to be entering for the purpose of committing an act that will result “in death or 
serious bodily injury; or kidnapping or sexual intercourse by force or threat.”42 
The most significant portion of the 2011 law extends the justifiable use of 
force outside of the home by removing the duty to retreat in all situations and 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See id. 
 37 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b)(2.1)–(3); Pa’s ‘Stand Your Ground’ Law Different from Flor-
ida’s, CBS PITTSBURGH (July 18, 2013), http://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2013/07/18/pa-s-stand-your-
ground-law-different-from-floridas/ [https://perma.cc/EL39-B89S]; Jonathon D. Silver, Self-Defense Bill 
Backs Broader Deadly Force Use, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 29, 2010), http://www.post-
gazette.com/news/state/2010/05/29/Self-defense-bill-backs-broader-deadly-force-use/stories/20100
5290169 [https://perma.cc/3E4G-5DR9]. 
 38 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b)(3). 
 39 See id. § 505(b)(2.1)–(2.5). 
 40 See id. § 505(b)(2.1). 
 41 See id. § 505(b)(2.2). 
 42 Id. § 505(b)(2.5)(i)–(ii). 
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implementing the stand your ground doctrine.43 The new law establishes that 
when a person who is  
not engaged in a criminal activity,  who is not in illegal possession 
of a firearm and who is attacked in any place [that he has a right to 
be outside his dwelling or place of work, the person] has no duty to 
retreat and has the right to stand his ground and use force, including 
deadly force.44 
The law limits the use of force to instances when the person believes that it is 
immediately necessary to use force to protect himself from “death, serious 
bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse by force or threat.”45 It further 
requires that the person against whom force is used have a “firearm or replica 
of the firearm,” or “any other weapon readily or apparently capable of lethal 
use.”46 Further highlighting the constancy of movement on the issue, in 2013, 
bills were introduced in the Pennsylvania legislature to repeal or to alter the 
stand your ground provisions enacted in 2011.47 An additional bill was intro-
duced in 2015 that, if passed, would retain the stand your ground provision and 
would expand the justifiable use of force to situations in which the defendant is 
outnumbered or the assailant possesses the physical capacity to inflict death or 
other serious injury.48 As of early 2016, however, the 2011 version remains in 
effect.49 
The Pennsylvania incarnation of stand your ground and diminished duty 
to retreat reflects a variation of the simpler version enacted in Florida.50 The 
Florida law states: 
A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he 
or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force 
is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to him-
self or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of 
a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force 
in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat 
and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See id. § 505(b)(2.3). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. § 505(2.3)(ii). 
 46 Id. § 505(2.3)(iii).  There are also additional provisions for public officials.  See id. § 505(2.4), 
(2.6). 
 47 See, e.g., H.R. 1812, 197th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013). 
48 See H.R. 45, 199th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2015). 
49 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505. 
 50 See id. § 505(b)(2.3); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012(2). 
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threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal ac-
tivity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be.51 
By including the broad “forcible felony” language, this statute allows the use 
of force in a greater range of situations.52 Further, the Florida statute does not 
require that the person against whom force is used have a weapon.53 
B. Status of English Law 
In England, the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, like U.S. law, 
states that the common-law justification of self-defense is a defense.54 Unlike 
U.S. law, English law has focused its adjustment of the duty to retreat on the 
requirement that the use of force in self-defense be reasonable.55 The 2008 Act 
provided that the degree of force used by a defendant in self-defense is not rea-
sonable when it is disproportionate to the circumstances as the defendant genu-
inely believed them to be.56 A provision was added in 2013 to make special 
guidelines for householder cases (cases where the defendant, not a trespasser, 
was defending his person in or partially within his dwelling from a person be-
lieved to be a trespasser),57 stating, “In a householder case, the degree of force 
used by [defendant] is not to be regarded as having been reasonable in the cir-
cumstances as [defendant] believed them to be if it was grossly disproportion-
ate in those circumstances.”58 At the time of its passage, a memorandum from 
Home Affairs to the Members of Parliament explained that this section was 
born from a desire to give greater legal protection to individuals who defend 
themselves in their homes.59 
Historically in England, a strict duty to retreat limited the right of self-
defense under the theory that the use of force was the exclusive purview of the 
Crown.60 Thus, Englishmen were not thought to have a general right to seek 
their own justice through self-defense but were to avail themselves of the 
                                                                                                                           
 51 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012(2). 
 52 See id. §§ 776.012(2), 776.08 (“‘Forcible felony’ means treason; murder; manslaughter; sexual 
battery; carjacking; home-invasion robbery; robbery; burglary; arson; kidnapping; aggravated assault; 
aggravated battery; aggravated stalking; aircraft piracy; unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of 
a destructive device or bomb; and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force 
or violence against any individual.”). 
 53 See id. § 776.012(2). 
 54 See Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, c. 4, § 76(2)(a) (Eng.). 
 55 See id. § 76(3); R v. Bird, [1985] 2 All E.R. 513 (C.A.) at 516 (Eng.). 
 56 See Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, c. 4. § 76(6) (Eng.). 
 57 Self-Defence and the Prevention of Crime, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., http://www.cps.gov.
uk/legal/s_to_u/self_defence/ [https://perma.cc/Z8GL-EN9Z] (last visited Mar. 24, 2016). 
 58 Crimes and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, § 43(2) (Eng.) (amending Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Act 2008, c. 4, § 76 (Eng.)) (emphasis added). 
 59 See Home Affairs, Householders and the Criminal Law of Self Defence, 9–12, HC n. 
SN/HA/1959 (Jan. 10, 2013) (UK). 
 60 See BROWN, supra note 12, at 4. 
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courts.61 The obligation of strict retreat required that the victim of an attack 
had to retreat until his back was to the wall before he or she could employ 
force in self-defense.62 This was the law as recorded by Blackstone, and it re-
mained the law into modernity in England.63 
In the twentieth century and in the face of arguments that Englishmen 
should have no duty to retreat before using force in self-defense, English 
courts reformulated the duty to retreat, changing the obligation from an indi-
vidual requirement to a factor to be considered when evaluating whether the 
amount of force used by the defendant in self-defense was reasonable.64 Under 
this iteration of retreat, a defendant’s use of force in self-defense may be de-
termined to be unreasonable if he failed to retreat when the opportunity of safe 
retreat presented itself.65 In this manner, the English duty to retreat has been 
weakened, but not abandoned entirely, and the present “duty” is not an indi-
vidual requirement but a factor used to determine the reasonableness of a de-
fendant’s actions.66 
II. DISCUSSION 
In his quintessential work on the common law, Commentaries on the Law 
of England, William Blackstone wrote that a self-defense plea required proof 
that the person who ultimately killed his attacker had “no other probable 
means of escaping his assailant.”67 He concluded that the law required a self-
defense claimant to have retreated as far as safely possibly before employing 
force against his attacker.68 Blackstone’s famous work reflected the law of 
England in 1758, and it became highly influential among American lawyers 
during the nineteenth century.69 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See id.  
 62 See id. 
 63 See LEVERICK, supra note 19, at 70–71; WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAW OF ENGLAND, 646–47 (William Hardcastle Browne ed., 1897). 
 64 See Bird, 2 All E.R. at 516 (concluding the ability to retreat is a factor for determining the 
reasonableness of the use of force); R v. Julien, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 839 (AC) at 842 (Eng.) (explaining 
that the appellant’s brief included, without citing authority, the assertion that “an Englishman is not 
bound to run away when threatened, but can stand his ground and defend himself where he is”). 
 65 See Bird, 2 All E.R. at 516; LEVERICK, supra note 19, at 73–74. 
 66 See Bird, 2 All E.R. at 516. 
 67 BLACKSTONE, supra note 63, at 646. 
 68 Id. at 647. 
 69 See id. at 1 n.1; Sir William Blackstone, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/68589/Sir-William-Blackstone [https://perma.cc/6HQS-MPD4] (last visited Mar. 
24, 2016). 
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A. Development of U.S. Law 
Early American jurists were not strangers to the common-law formula of 
self-defense, which required retreat before the use of force in self-defense 
could be justified.70 Instead, they acknowledged and rejected it over time.71 
Yet, even as Midwestern judges added the final nails to the coffin, the duty to 
retreat had its supporters in academia and on the bench.72 These common law 
traditionalists, however, eventually lost the battle to retain the duty to retreat in 
the United States.73 By 2013, thirty-one states had done away with the duty to 
retreat outside of the home through either judicial or legislative enactment.74 
This development of U.S. law away from the duty to retreat took shape over 
the first one hundred years of American history and even continues today.75 
The 1806 Massachusetts case Commonwealth v. Selfridge exemplifies the 
early shift in the American perspective on self-defense.76 In Selfridge, the de-
fendant was an attorney hired by a Democratic Party committeeperson to pur-
sue a suit against the committee’s chairman regarding the contested costs of a 
party dinner organized by the committee.77 The chairman, Benjamin Austin, 
was the father of the eventual victim, Charles Austin.78 After the suit settled, 
Benjamin Austin and Thomas Selfridge exchanged a series of quarrelsome let-
ters, which provoked Selfridge to publish a newspaper advertisement discredit-
ing Austin and caused Austin to respond promptly in kind.79 The day that the 
advertisements appeared in local newspapers, Selfridge was advised that he 
would be physically attacked in some manner by Austin or his associates.80 
That afternoon, Selfridge left his office and encountered Charles Austin in the 
street.81 The younger Austin struck Selfridge in the head with a walking stick, 
but before he could land the first or second blow, Selfridge fired his pistol and 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See Commonwealth v. Selfridge (Mass. 1806), in L.B. HORRIGAN & SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, 
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shot Austin.82 Austin was shot through the lungs, but he continued to beat 
Selfridge until dying quickly from the gunshot.83 
The grand jury was charged by Chief Justice Parsons of the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts on the law of self-defense.84 Just thirty years 
after American independence in 1776, Chief Justice Parsons had already em-
braced the abandonment of the duty to retreat.85 Chief Justice Parsons de-
scribed the law of self-defense to the jury, stating, “A man may repel force by 
force in the defence of his person, against any one who manifestly intends or 
endeavors by violence or surprise, feloniously to kill him.”86 Explicitly reflect-
ing his belief that self-defense did not require retreat, he continued his charge, 
adding, “And he is not obliged to retreat, but he may pursue his adversary until 
he has secured himself from all danger; and if he kill him in so doing, it is jus-
tifiable self-defence.”87 He went on to explain that the law required that the 
assailant actually make an overt act and that the defendant have an actual and 
reasonable belief of his assailant’s felonious intent.88 The Chief Justice in-
structed the jury that if Selfridge reasonably believed a felony was about to be 
committed against him but that was not in fact the case, Selfridge could be 
charged with manslaughter, or the killing could be justifiable.89 The grand jury 
ultimately indicted Selfridge for manslaughter.90 
At the trial, Justice Parker, who had apparently not adopted Chief Justice 
Parsons’s view of the duty to retreat, instructed the jury using the common-law 
version of self-defense requiring retreat.91 He asserted that this iteration of the 
law had been consistent from Sir Edward Coke through William Blackstone.92 
He told the jury that a man who is attacked with intent to kill him or cause him 
great bodily harm “may lawfully kill the assailant, provided he use all the 
means in his power, otherwise, to save his own life, . . . such as retreating as 
far as he can, or disabling his adversary, without killing him if it be in his pow-
er.”93 The Justice added that when retreat would increase danger, the person 
attacked may kill the attacker without retreat.94 He also noted that the killing 
can be justified so long as the person attacked reasonably believed that he was 
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going to be killed or suffer severe bodily harm, even if it is ultimately not the 
case.95 The jury returned a verdict of not guilty.96 
When Commonwealth v. Selfridge was recorded in the 1874 text Select 
American Cases on the Law of Self-Defence, the editors appended lengthy 
notes discussing the duty to retreat as articulated in Selfridge and later cases.97 
Referencing English commentators Sir Michael Foster and his American pro-
tégés Francis Wharton and Joel Prentiss Bishop, the editors suggested that the 
law actually implied a duty to resist a felony with force and not to retreat.98 
While the views of these commentators were widely eschewed in England, 
they were embraced in the United States.99 The authors, therefore, concluded 
that Justice Parker’s articulation of the law was in error because it required 
retreat from a felonious attack in any case in which retreat were possible.100 
The editors asserted that an examination of U.S. cases would reveal that no 
U.S. judge since Justice Parker had instructed that the law required retreat in 
the case of a felonious attack.101 Although the editors maintained that the law 
did not require retreat, they suggested that under the facts in Selfridge, the kill-
ing of Austin was not justifiable.102 According to the editors, while a person 
attacked has no duty to retreat from a felonious assault, a reasonable man 
could not have concluded Austin’s attack on Selfridge to have been felonious, 
for, in their opinion, no reasonable man could have concluded that the intent of 
the attack was anything more than “severe chastisement.”103 They concluded 
that the attack against Selfridge was, therefore, merely a brutal caning as part 
of a “personal conflict” and not a felonious attack.104 
Later in the nineteenth century, as the population moved westward and 
Americans developed an increasingly distinctive culture, the duty to retreat 
was abandoned with increasing frequency.105 In 1800, Ohio had just over forty-
two thousand residents, but by 1880, the population had grown to more than 
seventy-one times its 1800 number and included over three million people.106 
The number continued to grow, as nearly one million additional people resided 
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in Ohio by 1900 and over eleven million people by 2000.107 It was in Ohio in 
1876, amid this rapid westward expansion, that one of the most influential and 
oft-cited cases of the American movement away from the duty to retreat 
arose.108 
Erwin v. State added what is known as the “true man” doctrine to U.S. ju-
risprudence on self-defense and the duty to retreat.109 In Erwin, a feud had de-
veloped between the defendant and the decedent, the defendant’s son-in-law, 
over possession and use of a shed situated between their homes.110 The dispute 
waged on and included incidents in which all of the defendant’s tools were 
removed from the shed and thrown outside.111 One day, the defendant was re-
securing his instruments inside the shed with a chain when a verbal altercation 
erupted between him and his son-in-law.112 The son-in-law approached the 
shed with an ax on his shoulder and—possibly defying his father-in-law’s 
command not to enter the shed—came under its eaves.113 As his son-in-law 
approached, Erwin drew a pistol, shot, and killed him.114 
Erwin was indicted and found guilty of second-degree murder.115 When 
charging the jury, the trial judge repeated Justice Parker’s articulation of self-
defense in Selfridge verbatim.116 Thus, the jurors were told that Erwin was re-
quired to “use all means in his power otherwise to save his own life or to pre-
vent the intended harm,” including, “retreating as far as he [could].”117 On ap-
peal, Erwin challenged this instruction because it required retreat.118 The Su-
preme Court of Ohio stated that it had not previously ruled on the duty to re-
treat and initiated an energetic discussion of legal authorities on the matter.119 
The court identified a passage by Sir Matthew Hale—an English judge 
considered to be one of history’s greatest scholars of the common law, who 
lived from 1609 to 1676—stating that although the law generally requires re-
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treat, there are a few exceptions.120 Among these exceptions was that “[i]f a 
thief assaults a true man either abroad or in his house to rob or kill him, the 
true man is not bound to give back, but may kill the assailant, and it is not fel-
ony.”121 The court moved on to recite some of Foster’s writing, which posited 
that retreat is not required when a person is met with a felonious attack.122 The 
court addressed Selfridge by asserting that Justice Parker’s charge was highly 
contextual.123 Justice Parker, claimed the court, was attempting to fashion a 
rule whereby justifiable homicide—in the face of a felony—did not require 
retreat, but justifiable homicide—in the face of an attack that could not be rea-
sonably believed to be felonious—did require retreat.124 
The court acknowledged that “[t]he law, out of tenderness for human life 
and the frailties of human nature, will not permit the taking of it to repel a mere 
trespass, or even to save life, where the assault is provoked.”125 Nonetheless, the 
court went on to conclude that “a true man, who is without fault, is not obliged 
to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take 
his life or do him enormous bodily harm.”126 The ruling essentially abrogated 
the duty to retreat in Ohio, and the opinion was soon cited with approval by 
state supreme courts across the country.127 
One year later, and one state further west, the Indiana Supreme Court fur-
ther contributed to the American abandonment of the duty to retreat.128 In 
Runyan v. State, the defendant shot and killed an acquaintance who had struck 
him during a politically motivated brawl.129 The defendant, found guilty of 
murder, appealed and asserted error in the jury instruction, which had required 
retreat in all cases in which it could be carried out safely.130 In reversing the 
conviction, the Indiana Supreme Court summarized that the “ancient doctrine,” 
which required retreat “ha[d] been greatly modified in this country.”131 In fact, 
the court posited that the undoing of the duty to retreat was now ingrained 
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within American culture.132 It stated that “the tendency of the American mind 
seems to be very strongly against the enforcement of any rule” requiring re-
treat, whether the motivation for the retreat was to avoid punishment or to 
avoid the taking of a life.133 
In light of this case law and similar developments, Professor Eugene Vo-
lokh counted that, as of 2013, thirty-one states had eliminated the duty to re-
treat by either legislation or judicial enactment.134 Prompted by the shooting 
death of unarmed teen Trayvon Martin, many Americans have severely criti-
cized these stand your ground laws, citing their disproportionate impact on 
women and African Americans and rallying for their repeal.135 Other commen-
tators have posited that this modification to self-defense law was not to the 
advantage of white American males alone, but that women and black civil 
rights leaders also have benefitted by the nature in which American self-
defense law has developed.136 
B. Development of English Law 
Self-defense is an ancient and well-established principle of the common 
law in England dating back to at least the 1200s.137 Its status as an available 
defense was preserved and codified in the Criminal Justice and Immigration 
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Act 2008.138 The Act does not define the defense but simply codifies the com-
mon law pursuant to which self-defense is a defense to criminal charges.139 
Prior to 1969, there was little precedent regarding the duty to retreat in the 
context of self-defense, but it appeared, based on authorities like Blackstone, 
that the duty to retreat before using force in self-defense was without excep-
tion.140 In 1969, however, the court in R v. Julien found that the duty to retreat 
did not necessarily require flight in every circumstance, but it at least required 
that the defendant displayed a willingness not to fight, evidenced perhaps by 
“physical withdrawal.”141 In Julien, the defendant had an altercation with an-
other man in which the defendant threw a milk bottle at the man, striking him 
atop the head and causing injury.142 The defendant claimed that he was acting 
in self-defense after his victim had first threatened him with a “chopper.”143 
The court determined that although the facts were subject to dispute, the sole 
question for the jury was whether or not the defendant was justified under the 
self-defense doctrine.144 The defendant argued that the trial judge should not 
have included that the defendant had a duty to retreat in his self-defense in-
struction to the jury.145 Instead, the defendant argued for an abrogation of the 
duty to retreat suggesting to the court that “an Englishman is not bound to run 
away when threatened, but can stand his ground and defend himself where he 
is.”146 
The court in Julien was quick to point out that the defendant cited no au-
thority for his assertion that the law gives a person the right to “stand his 
ground and defend himself where he is.”147 Although the court made clear that 
it agreed with the defendant that the primary texts on the law do not require a 
preliminary retreat before using force in self-defense, the court also indicated 
that there is no right to stand one’s ground.148 The court concluded that: 
It is not, as we understand it, the law that a person threatened must 
take to his heels and run in the dramatic way suggested by [defend-
ant’s counsel]; but what is necessary is that he should demonstrate 
by his actions that he does not want to fight. He must demonstrate 
that he is prepared to temporise and disengage and perhaps to make 
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some physical withdrawal; and that that is necessary as a feature of 
the justification of self-defence is true, in our opinion, whether the 
charge is a homicide charge or something less serious.149 
By reducing retreat to a demonstration of a will not to fight rather than requir-
ing actual physical removal from the confrontation, the rule in Julien reflects a 
less-stringent interpretation of the duty to retreat than English law was histori-
cally understood to require; however, it also expressly rejects the argument that 
a person has the right to “stand his ground and defend himself where he is.”150 
In 1985, the rule on the duty to retreat further evolved into its present 
form.151 In R v. Bird, after an argument broke out, the defendant dumped a 
glass of liquor over her ex-boyfriend.152 He retaliated by slapping the defend-
ant, and a verbal and physical altercation followed.153 According to the defend-
ant, her ex-boyfriend was holding her against a wall when she struck him with 
her hand.154 When she struck him, she was still holding the empty liquor glass, 
which broke and caused him injuries resulting in the loss of an eye.155 The trial 
court gave the instruction fashioned in Julien, stating that there was a duty to 
retreat, but the duty only required the defendant to demonstrate her unwilling-
ness to fight—not necessarily her physical withdrawal.156 The author of the 
Bird opinion, Lord Chief Justice Lane, was also on the Julien court and used 
the Bird opinion to expound upon the principles expressed in Julien.157 He ex-
plained in Bird that the Julien justices were “anxious to make it clear that there 
was no duty, despite earlier authorities to the contrary, actually to turn round or 
walk away from the scene.”158 Despite achieving this purpose, Lord Chief Jus-
tice Lane stated that the Julien court “placed too great an obligation on a de-
fendant in circumstances such as those in the instant case.”159 The appeals 
court held that the possibility of retreat was treated properly in Smith and Ho-
gan’s Criminal Law, a criminal law treatise, which the appellate court quoted 
with approval.160 That passage stated: 
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There were formerly technical rules about the duty to retreat before 
using force, or at least fatal force. This is now simply a factor to be 
taken into account in deciding whether it was necessary to use force, 
and whether the force was reasonable. If the only reasonable course 
is to retreat, then it would appear that to stand and fight must be to 
use unreasonable force. There is, however, no rule of law that a per-
son attacked is bound to run away if he can; but it has been said 
that—“ . . . what is necessary is that he should demonstrate by his 
actions that he does not want to fight. He must demonstrate that he 
is prepared to temporise and disengage and perhaps make some 
physical withdrawal.” It is submitted that it goes too far to say that 
action of this kind is necessary. It is scarcely consistent with the rule 
that it is permissible to use force, not merely to counter an actual at-
tack, but to ward off an attack honestly and reasonably believed to 
be imminent. A demonstration by D [the defendant] at the time that 
he did not want to fight is, no doubt, the best evidence that he was 
acting reasonably and in good faith in self-defence; but it is no more 
than that. A person may in some circumstances so act without tem-
porising, disengaging or withdrawing; and he should have a good 
defence.161 
This present rule—the rule stated in Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law—does 
not consider the duty to retreat as a separate element of a self-defense justifica-
tion.162 Instead, retreat is treated as an element for the trier of fact to consider 
in deciding whether the defendant’s use of force in self-defense was reasona-
ble.163 British legal scholars have suggested that this reconfiguration of the 
English law is a legal reply to the dissolution of the duty to retreat in the Unit-
ed States; through this reconfiguration, English law does not require a strict 
duty to retreat but maintains that retreat ought to remain a factor to be consid-
ered for the justification of self-defense.164 
There was further adjustment to English self-defense law in 2013 when, 
in order to provide additional assurances for people in their homes, the Crimes 
and Courts Act adjusted the rules for reasonableness of self-defense that had 
been set out in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act in 2008.165 The sec-
tion added in 2013 made special accommodations for cases involving house-
holders, allowing them to use disproportionate force so long as it was not 
grossly disproportionate to the circumstances as the defendant believed them 
                                                                                                                           
 161 Id. (quoting SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 6, at 327). 
 162 See id. 
 163 See id. 
 164 See LEVERICK, supra note 19, at 73–74. 
 165 Crimes and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, § 43(2) (Eng); Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008, c. 4, § 76(5A), (6) (Eng.); Home Affairs, supra note 59, at 1. 
2016] Adopting the English Approach to Retreat 471 
to be.166 Householder cases are those in which a person uses force to defend 
him or herself (but not for another purpose, like defending his or her property), 
inside or partially inside a dwelling where he or she is not a trespasser, from 
another person who he or she honestly believes to be a trespasser.167 
Thus while the U.S. justification of self-defense evolved primarily by ab-
rogating the duty to retreat, under English law, the defense has developed so as 
to incorporate the duty to retreat within the determination of whether a defend-
ant’s use of force was reasonable.168 
C. Gun Ownership and Homicide Rates in the United States and England 
When considering the law of self-defense in the United States and Eng-
land, it is important to bear in mind the relative gun-ownership figures in each 
country.169 In the United States, self-defense and retreat laws operate in the 
most heavily armed country in the world.170 There are likely between 83 and 
97 guns for every 100 Americans.171 Only machine guns and sawed-off long 
guns are prohibited at the federal level.172 There is no nationally required li-
cense for the ownership of legal firearms, and such a license exists in only a 
few states.173 Dealers—and in some states, private sellers—are, however, re-
quired to conduct background checks for all sales.174 In 2011, there were 4.7 
homicides in the United States for every 100,000 U.S. residents.175 Additional-
ly, for every 100,000 U.S. residents, there were 3.2 gun homicides in 2011.176 
That is, about 68% of homicides were gun homicides.177 
The situation is much different in England and Wales.178 In the 2014 sta-
tistical year, there were 0.92 homicides for every 100,000 of population.179 The 
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homicide rate generally increased beginning in the late 1960s, peaked in the 
2002 statistical year, and since has been in decline.180 The homicide victim was 
killed by a gun in just 29—or 6%—of the 2014 homicides.181 This number re-
mained consistent from the previous year but is currently at its lowest since 
1980.182 
Gun ownership in England and Wales is also much lower than it is in the 
United States.183 Estimates suggest that there are between 3.3 and 7.8 firearms 
for every 100 people in England and Wales.184 Handguns were effectively 
banned throughout Great Britain in 1998, and semiautomatic assault weapons 
and automatic weapons also are banned from civilian ownership.185 A license, 
which requires a background check and character reference, is required to own 
legal guns.186 Additionally, civilians wishing to own legal guns must demon-
strate an acceptable reason they need to own the gun, such as collecting or 
shooting sports.187 
III. ANALYSIS 
Many U.S. jurisdictions have abrogated the duty to retreat via mecha-
nisms such as the true man doctrine and the stand your ground doctrine; 
meanwhile, English law has reconfigured the duty to retreat such that it is no 
longer a strict duty but a factor in determining the reasonableness of the use of 
force in self-defense.188 Because Florida’s law removing the duty to retreat is 
stated simply and is typical of similar laws in the United States, it serves as a 
good example for comparative purposes.189 Such a comparison shows that the 
English formulation should be adopted in U.S. jurisdictions instead of shed-
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ding the duty to retreat or implementing stand your ground laws.190 In analyz-
ing both formulations, it is important to consider the benefits and drawbacks of 
each approach in relation to the prosecution and defense in the context of trial, 
the ability of the jury to understand and apply the law, and the respective cul-
tures and histories of both countries.191 
A. The Effect of Both Approaches on Trials and Juries 
Laws and doctrines that eliminate the duty to retreat often require the jury 
to decide whether or not the defendant reasonably believed that the use of 
deadly force was necessary to prevent death or serious injury or various felo-
nies being committed against him or her.192 In Florida, for example, this means 
“the appearance of danger must have been so real that a reasonably cautious 
and prudent person under the same circumstances would have believed that the 
danger could be avoided only through the use of that force.”193 The availability 
of safe retreat, however, is not a factor in this determination because the statute 
has explicitly removed it.194 Thus, the question that remains for the jury is one 
of reasonableness—regardless of the possibility of retreat.195 
Meanwhile, the modern English formulation asks jurors to determine 
whether or not the force used by a defendant acting in self-defense was reason-
able under the circumstances as that defendant believed them to be, so long as 
his belief about the circumstances is honest.196 Pursuant to the case law, this 
reasonableness assessment includes the consideration of whether or not safe 
retreat was an option.197 
In both the U.S. and English articulation of self-defense law, the jury is 
required to examine the reasonableness of the use of force.198 The difference 
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lies in whether and where the opportunity to retreat should enter the reasona-
bleness equation.199 In U.S. jurisdictions without a duty to retreat, as articulat-
ed in Erwin v. State, the jury may not consider whether the defendant had an 
opportunity for safe retreat.200 On the other hand, under the English rule in R v. 
Bird, a defense could stand or fail depending on whether a jury believed that 
the opportunity to retreat did not present itself or that it presented itself, but the 
defendant was not unreasonable in not retreating.201  
It is true that the adoption of the English approach may confuse American 
juries or give the juries a considerable amount of nullification power while 
considering the facts of individual cases.202 As commentator Fiona Leverick 
points out, a racially prejudiced jury would have an easier time acquitting a 
white defendant for the killing of a black victim when the law only requires a 
consideration of retreat in a reasonableness assessment, rather than a strict duty 
to retreat as in older common law.203 Professor Leverick’s argument may be 
true when the modern English articulation of self-defense law is compared to a 
strict duty to retreat.204 Even under the English version of retreat, however, 
such a racist acquittal is more difficult than a racist acquittal under a law that 
requires no duty to retreat at all, which is currently the standard in a majority 
of U.S. states.205 Further, it may remain true to some degree that a required 
duty to retreat lies—as the 1877 Indiana court phrased it—counter to the 
“American mind.”206 In 2013, a Quinnipiac University poll found that 53% of 
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Americans support stand your ground laws, which eliminate the duty to retreat, 
but this support varied greatly along political and racial lines.207 Allowing re-
treat to become an element of the reasonableness assessment may provide the 
flexibility sought by the American public, and it may assuage Americans’ con-
cerns that a strict doctrine of retreat would be too rigid to provide adequate 
protection and self-defense.208 In addition, it would prevent avoidable deaths 
by setting a higher bar than that set by stand your ground laws—particularly in 
cases where a person has an opportunity to safely retreat.209 
Compared to the complete elimination of the duty to retreat, including re-
treat in an analysis of reasonableness would narrow the range of situations in 
which self-defense could be applied successfully.210 This means that a defend-
ant would have to offer more evidence in order to effectively present a claim of 
self-defense.211 Specifically, convincing evidence would have to show that re-
treat was not available, or that if it were, the defendant’s use of force was not 
unreasonable despite the availability of retreat.212 Likewise, a prosecutor may 
have a stronger case if he can present convincing evidence that retreat was an 
option and that the defendant’s actions were not reasonable because he ne-
glected to retreat.213 The ultimate effect of adopting the English-inspired ap-
proach to the duty to retreat is that it would narrow the successful application 
of the justification of self-defense.214 
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B. Retreat in Culture and History 
The Ohio Supreme Court wrote its famous true man doctrine in 1876, 
stating, “a true man, who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assail-
ant, who, by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him 
enormous bodily harm.”215 Despite its wide acceptance, this doctrine was met 
with scathing reviews in two 1903 articles published in the Columbia Law Re-
view and the Harvard Law Review by Joseph H. Beale, a distinguished Ameri-
can legal scholar.216 
In the more animated of the two critiques, Beale emphasized that it re-
mained unquestioned that necessary killings in self-defense were to be “ex-
cused, and must be acquitted when indicted.”217 He then presented the histori-
cal development of the law of self-defense and pointed out that it was much 
more frequently argued in U.S. courts than in English courts.218 He criticized 
the elimination of the duty to retreat—which was becoming prevalent in the 
southern and western United States—as being rooted “in the ethics of the du-
elist, the German officer, and the buccaneer.”219 To demonstrate that these ide-
als did not represent all of American culture, he cited a contemporary Alabama 
judge who rejected the notion of “wounded pride or honor in declining combat, 
or sense of shame in being denounced as cowardly” over human life as 
“trash.”220 
Beale highlighted that the problem of being met with a dangerous attack 
is centuries old, and he acknowledged that safe retreat at the barrel of a gun is 
much rarer than safe retreat when met with less-deadly implements.221 Accord-
ing to Beale, however, “[t]he problem is the same now in America as it was 
three centuries ago in England,” and the growing improbability of safe retreat 
should not mean that the law should require the attempt to retreat safely any 
less frequently.222 Airing his distaste for the evolution of abolishing retreat, 
Beale exclaimed that it was born from the same “feeling which is responsible 
for the duel, for war, for lynching”—all of which Beale believed had been dis-
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paraged by societal progress.223 He made one more quip about American cul-
ture, stating, “It is undoubtedly distasteful to retreat; but is ten times more dis-
tasteful to kill.”224 Assuredly—despite the slim margin of support among 
Americans for modern stand your ground laws and the reconfiguring of the 
duty to retreat by English courts—the primacy and preservation of human life 
stands.225 
Beale’s argument is not based in social and cultural considerations alone 
but is also grounded in the law of self-defense.226 He was careful to explain 
that the requirement of retreat was not blind to the circumstances.227 Instead, 
retreat was never required when it could not be done in complete safety.228 
There were further exceptions, such as the ubiquitous castle doctrine, which 
never required retreat in or around the home.229 Beale understood that more 
attacks in the United States were being carried out with guns, and in light of 
this, he maintained that, as retreat was only required when it could be done 
safely, self-defense still justifies the use of force in such situations where safe 
retreat is impossible.230 
Of course, Beale was advocating for a required duty to retreat, not the 
version of retreat that was developed in English courts in the twentieth centu-
ry.231 His arguments for retaining the duty to retreat, however, lend themselves 
to the argument in support of the English application of the duty to retreat, 
where retreat is a consideration in an analysis of reasonableness.232 For exam-
ple, if modern jurors believe—as Beale did—that it is distasteful to retreat but 
even more distasteful to kill, then they are less likely to find the use of force in 
self-defense to be reasonable when safe retreat is an option.233 Further, Beale’s 
observations about the prevalence and unique nature of guns as well as the lim-
ited likelihood of safe retreat stand true today.234 By acknowledging that retreat 
may be the best means of proving the reasonableness of the use of force in 
self-defense but accepting that it is not the only means, the English rule would 
allow jurors assessing the availability of retreat as an element of reasonable-
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ness to consider the situation in a manner that incorporates American culture 
regarding self-defense and the prevalence of guns in American society without 
allowing them to ignore retreat entirely.235 
C. Mechanism for Change 
In the United States, the shedding of the duty to retreat was both a judicial 
and legislative initiative.236 In England, the reconfiguration of the duty to re-
treat from duty per se to a factor in the assessment of reasonableness was ef-
fected by judicial policymaking.237 If U.S. jurisdictions wish to change their 
retreat laws to reflect the English formulation suggested by this Note, they 
should do so by legislative enactment.238 This should be done because, where-
as the common law is often changed slowly and incrementally, statutory law 
allows the legislature to make extensive modifications to the law.239 
The English case Bird offers guidance on how U.S. jurisdictions could ad-
just their self-defense laws to include retreat.240 The Bird court relied on an 
authoritative criminal law text, which was likely linked to an earlier ruling in 
an Australian case, R v. Howe.241 In turn, the court in Howe held that retreat 
before using force was no longer a singular requirement of self-defense, and it 
stated that “[w]hether a retreat could or should have been made is merely an 
element for the jury to consider as entering into the reasonableness of the con-
duct of the accused.”242 State legislatures could adopt similar language into 
self-defense laws across the United States.243 
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As an example, Florida’s stand your ground provision could be reformed 
using the Bird ruling and considering the Howe terminology.244 The current 
Florida law states: 
A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he 
or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force 
is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to him-
self or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of 
a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force 
in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat 
and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or 
threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal ac-
tivity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be.245 
The abrogation of the duty to retreat is clearly stated in the second sentence of 
the provision.246 To institute the English-style retreat, drafters should delete 
this sentence.247 Then, a separate subsection should include language similar to 
the following: “Necessity of self-defense means reasonable necessity and is an 
issue of fact. In considering reasonable necessity, a fact-finder shall take into 
account retreat or demonstration of an unwillingness to fight.”248 This change 
would incorporate the English rule’s inclusion of retreat in a reasonableness 
assessment that is to be determined by the jury.249 If the legislature was so in-
clined, it could include additional factors that may be taken into account in the 
assessment of the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions such as whether he 
or she was “engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has 
a right to be.”250 Such an edit to the existing law does not create a strict duty to 
retreat, but it does include retreat in a way that allows American jurors to con-
sider the entirety of the circumstances, including cultural views on retreat.251 
Borrowing such a concept from English law would not only be more protective 
of life than abolishing the duty to retreat but also more in line with American 
history and perception of self-defense.252 
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CONCLUSION 
Evaluating the ways in which the U.S. and English legal systems have ad-
justed the common-law duty to retreat shows that there are options for how 
modern law may apply the historic duty before permitting the use of force in 
self-defense. Many states in the United States have removed the duty to retreat 
from the consideration of self-defense entirely. England, on the other hand, has 
not entirely eliminated the duty to retreat but has reconfigured it to be a factor 
to consider when evaluating the reasonableness and necessity of self-defense. 
The modern English approach as articulated in the 1985 case R v. Bird should 
be adopted in the United States. 
The English approach conceived in Bird maintains that retreat is an im-
portant factor in self-defense while also recognizing that certain circumstances 
might outweigh it. In the United States, those circumstances might include 
American perceptions of self-defense and the cultural prevalence of guns, 
which likely would render the application of the law different from its applica-
tion in England and Australia. The law in the various states of the United 
States should be updated to include language reflecting the English rule in 
Bird. Scholars critical of weaker retreat rules have posited that such an articu-
lation of retreat might empower juries to act on individual biases and prejudic-
es rather than legal concepts. Practically speaking, however, in the United 
States, an English-style retreat rule is actually more in line with cultural per-
ceptions about self-defense and is also more protective of human life than the 
outright elimination of the duty to retreat. Adopting the English approach 
would allow a type of compromise that would be both sensitive to Americans’ 
gun ownership and more protective of human life. 
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